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terest in the status quo, because of death,
and rejection of a continua
resignation,
Senate of incumbent
tion by the U.S.
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Of course, broader examinations
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also try to assess the relative impact of
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that "these commis
position
sions have been transformed
into arms of
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In sum, this work suggest that Presi
dential scholars might be well advised to
seek patterns and changes
in policy out
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effect.
puts as indicators of Presidential
By examining policy outputs over time, as
is done here with official deceptive prac
tice complaints,
the actions of individual
can be placed in context, and
Presidents
such as partisanship,
forces,
important
as explanatory
will
variables.
emerge
are
Even when
such broad explanations
not possible,
tracking policy outputs over
to important
time could alert scholars
changes which occurred and focus efforts
for those seeking to explain the historical
import of particular Presidents.
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